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Abstract
We build a theoretical model of multi-product rms that highlights how competition across
market destinations aects both a rm's exported product range and product mix. We show
how tougher competition in an export market induces a rm to skew its export sales towards its
best performing products. We nd very strong conrmation of this competitive eect for French
exporters across export market destinations. Theoretically, this within rm change in product
mix driven by the trading environment has important repercussions on rm productivity. A
calibrated t to our theoretical model reveals that these productivity eects are potentially
quite large.
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Exports by multi-product rms dominate world trade ows. Variations in these trade ows across
destinations reect in part the decisions by multi-product rms to vary the range of their exported
products across destinations with dierent market conditions.1 In this paper, we further analyze
the eects of those export market conditions on the relative export sales of those goods: we refer
to this as the rm's product mix choice. We build a theoretical model of multi-product rms that
highlights how market size and geography (the market sizes of, and bilateral economic distances
to, trading partners) aect both a rm's exported product range and its exported product mix
across market destinations. Dierences in market sizes and geography generate dierences in the
toughness of competition across markets. Tougher competition shifts down the entire distribution
of markups across products and induces rms to skew their export sales towards their better per-
forming products. We nd very strong conrmation of this competitive eect for French exporters
across export market destinations. Our theoretical model shows how this eect of export market
competition on a rm's product mix then translates into dierences in measured rm productivity:
when a rm skews its production towards better performing products, it also allocates relatively
more workers to the production of those goods and raises its overall output (and sales) per worker.
Thus, a rm producing a given set of products with given unit input requirements will produce rela-
tively more output and sales per worker (across products) when it exports to markets with tougher
competition. To our knowledge, this is a new channel through which competition (both in export
markets and at home) aects rm-level productivity. This eect of competition on rm-level pro-
ductivity is compounded by another channel that operates through the endogenous response of the
rm's product range: rms respond to increased competition by dropping their worst performing
products.2
Feenstra and Ma (2008) and Eckel and Neary (2010) also build theoretical models of multi-
product rms that highlight the eect of competition on the distribution of rm product sales.
Both models incorporate the cannibalization eect that occurs as large rms expand their product
range. In our model, we rely on the competition eects from the demand side, which are driven by
variations in the number of sellers and their average prices across export markets. The cannibaliza-
1See Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for Europe, Bernard et al (2007) for the U.S., and Arkolakis and Muendler
(2010) for Brazil.
2Bernard et al (2011) and Eckel and Neary (2010) emphasize this second channel. They show how trade lib-
eralization between symmetric countries induces rms to drop their worst performing products (a focus on \core
competencies") leading to intra-rm productivity gains. We discuss those papers in further detail below.
1tion eect does not occur as a continuum of rms each produce a discrete number of products and
thus never attain nite mass. The benets of this simplication is that we can consider an open
economy equilibrium with multiple asymmetric countries and asymmetric trade barriers whereas
Feenstra and Ma (2008) and Eckel and Neary (2010) restrict their analysis to a single globalized
world with no trade barriers. Thus, our model is able to capture the key role of geography in
shaping dierences in competition across export market destinations.3
Another approach to the modeling of multi-product rms relies on a nested C.E.S. structure
for preferences, where a continuum of rms produce a continuum of products. The cannibalization
eect is ruled out by restricting the nests in which rms can introduce new products. Allanson
and Montagna (2005) consider such a model in a closed economy, while Arkolakis and Muendler
(2010) and Bernard et al (2011) develop extensions to open economies. Given the C.E.S. structure
of preferences and the continuum assumptions, markups across all rms and products are exoge-
nously xed. Thus, dierences in market conditions or proportional reductions in trade costs have
no eect on a rm's product mix choice (the relative distribution of export sales across products).
In contrast, variations in markups across destinations (driven by dierences in competition) gen-
erate dierences in relative exports across destinations in our model: a given rm selling the same
two products across dierent markets will export relatively more of the better performing product
in markets where competition is tougher. In our comprehensive data covering nearly all French
exports, we nd that there is substantial variation in this relative export ratio across French export
destinations, and that this variation is consistently related to dierences in market size and geogra-
phy across those destinations (market size and geography both aect the toughness of competition
across destinations). French exporters substantially skew their export sales towards their better
performing products in markets where they face tougher competition.
Theoretically, we show how this eect of tougher competition in an export market on the
exported product mix is also associated with an increase in productivity for the set of exported
products to that market. We show how rm-level measures of exported output per worker as well as
deated sales per worker for a given export destination (counting only the exported units to a given
destination and the associated labor used to produce those units) increase with tougher competition
in that destination. This eect of competition on rm productivity holds even when one xes the
3Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Baldwin and Gu (2009) also develop models with multi-product rms and a pro-
competitive eect coming from the demand side. These models investigate the eects of globalization on a rm's
product scope and average production levels per product. However, those models consider the case of rms producing
symmetric products whereas we focus on the eects of competition on the within-rm distribution of product sales.
2set of products exported, thus eliminating any potential eects from the extensive (product) margin
of trade. Then, the rm-level productivity increase is entirely driven by the response of the rm's
product mix: producing relatively more of the better performing products raises measured rm
productivity. We use our theoretical model to calibrate the relationship between the skewness of
the French exporters' product mix and a productivity average for those exporters. We nd that our
measured variation in product mix skewness across destinations corresponds to large dierences in
productivity. The eect of a doubling of destination country GDP on the French exporters' product
mix corresponds to a measured productivity dierential between 4% and 7%.
Our model also features a response of the extensive margin of trade: tougher competition in the
domestic market induces rms to reduce the set of produced products, and tougher competition in
an export market induces exporters to reduce the set of exported products. We do not emphasize
these results for the extensive margin, because they are quite sensitive to the specication of xed
production and export costs. In order to maintain the tractability of our multi-country asymmetric
open economy, we abstract from those xed costs (increasing returns are generated uniquely from
the xed/sunk entry cost). Conditional on the production and export of given sets of products,
such xed costs would not aect the relative production or export levels of those products. These
are the product mix outcomes that we emphasize (and for which we nd strong empirical support).
Although we focus our empirical analysis on these novel cross-sectional predictions, our model
also predicts extensive and intensive margin responses over time to multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion. Such liberalization induces an increase in the toughness of competition in each country. In
response, rms reduce the number of products they produce and skew production and sales (in
each destination) towards their better performing products. These rm-level responses have all
been documented in recent empirical work on the eects of trade liberalization in North America.
Baldwin and Gu (2009), Bernard et al (2011), and Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) all report that
(respectively) Canadian, U.S., and Mexican rms have reduced the number of products they pro-
duce during these trade-liberalization episodes. Baldwin and Gu (2009) and Bernard et al (2011)
further report that CUSFTA induced a signicant increase in the skewness of production across
products (an increase in entropy). Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) separately measure the skewness of
Mexican rms' export sales to the US. They report an increase in this skewness following NAFTA:
They show that Mexican rms expanded their exports of their better performing products (higher
market shares) signicantly more than those for their worse performing exported products during
the period of trade expansion from 1994-2003.
3Our paper proceeds as follows. We rst develop a closed economy version of our model in
order to focus on the endogenous responses of a rm's product scope and product mix to market
conditions. We highlight how competition aects the skewness of a rm's product mix, and how this
translates into dierences in rm productivity. Thus, even in a closed economy, increases in market
size lead to increases in within-rm productivity via this product mix response. We then develop
the open economy version of our model with multiple asymmetric countries and an arbitrary matrix
of bilateral trade costs. The equilibrium connects dierences in market size and geography to the
toughness of competition in every market, and how the latter shapes a rm's exported product
mix to that destination. We then move on to our empirical test for this exported product mix
response for French rms. We show how destination market size as well as its geography induce
increased skewness in the rms' exported product mix to that destination. In the last section before
concluding we quantify the economic signicance of those measured dierences in export skewness
for productivity.
2 Closed Economy
Our model is based on an extension of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) that allows rms to endoge-
nously determine the set of products that they produce. We start with a closed economy version
of this model where L consumers each supply one unit of labor.
2.1 Preferences and Demand
Preferences are dened over a continuum of dierentiated varieties indexed by i 2 
, and a ho-
mogenous good chosen as numeraire. All consumers share the same utility function given by
U = qc
0 + 
Z
i2

qc
idi  
1
2

Z
i2

(qc
i)
2 di  
1
2

Z
i2

qc
idi
2
; (1)
where qc
0 and qc
i represent the individual consumption levels of the numeraire good and each variety
i. The demand parameters ; ; and  are all positive. The parameters  and  index the
substitution pattern between the dierentiated varieties and the numeraire: increases in  and
decreases in  both shift out the demand for the dierentiated varieties relative to the numeraire.
The parameter  indexes the degree of product dierentiation between the varieties. In the limit
when  = 0, consumers only care about their consumption level over all varieties, Qc =
R
i2
 qc
idi;
and the varieties are then perfect substitutes. The degree of product dierentiation increases with
4 as consumers give increasing weight to smoothing consumption levels across varieties.
Our specication of preferences intentionally does not distinguish between the varieties produced
by the same rm relative to varieties produced by other rms. We do not see any clear reason to
enforce that varieties produced by a rm be closer substitutes than varieties produced by dierent
rms { or vice-versa. Of course, some rms operate across sectors, in which case the varieties
produced in dierent sectors would be more dierentiated than varieties produced by other rms
within the same sector. We eliminate those cross-sector, within rm, varieties in our empirical work
by restricting our analysis to the range of varieties produced by a rm within a sector classication.
The marginal utilities for all varieties are bounded, and a consumer may not have positive de-
mand for any particular variety. We assume that consumers have positive demand for the numeraire
good (qc
0 > 0). The inverse demand for each variety i is then given by
pi =    qc
i   Qc; (2)
whenever qc
i > 0. Let 
  
 be the subset of varieties that are consumed (such that qc
i > 0).
Equation (2) can then be inverted to yield the linear market demand system for these varieties:
qi  Lqc
i =
L
M + 
 
L

pi +
M
M + 
L

 p; 8i 2 
; (3)
where M is the measure of consumed varieties in 
 and  p = (1=M)
R
i2
 pidi is their average price.
The set 
 is the largest subset of 
 that satises
pi 
1
M + 
( + M p)  pmax; (4)
where the right hand side price bound pmax represents the price at which demand for a variety is
driven to zero. Note that (2) implies pmax  . In contrast to the case of C.E.S. demand, the
price elasticity of demand, "i  j(@qi=@pi)(pi=qi)j = [(pmax=pi)   1]
 1 ; is not uniquely determined
by the level of product dierentiation . Given the latter, lower average prices  p or a larger
number of competing varieties M induce a decrease in the price bound pmax and an increase in
the price elasticity of demand "i at any given pi. We characterize this as a `tougher' competitive
environment.4
4We also note that, given this competitive environment (given N and  p), the price elasticity "i monotonically
increases with the price pi along the demand curve.
5Welfare can be evaluated using the indirect utility function associated with (1):
U = Ic +
1
2
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 +

M
 1
(    p)
2 +
1
2
M

2
p; (5)
where Ic is the consumer's income and 2
p = (1=M)
R
i2
 (pi    p)
2 di represents the variance of
prices. To ensure positive demand levels for the numeraire, we assume that Ic >
R
i2
 piqc
idi =
 pQc M2
p=. Welfare naturally rises with decreases in average prices  p. It also rises with increases
in the variance of prices 2
p (holding the mean price  p constant), as consumers then re-optimize their
purchases by shifting expenditures towards lower priced varieties as well as the numeraire good.5
Finally, the demand system exhibits `love of variety': holding the distribution of prices constant
(namely holding the mean  p and variance 2
p of prices constant), welfare rises with increases in
product variety M.
2.2 Production and Firm Behavior
Labor is the only factor of production and is inelastically supplied in a competitive market. The
numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale at unit cost; its market is also compet-
itive. These assumptions imply a unit wage. Entry in the dierentiated product sector is costly as
each rm incurs product development and production startup costs. Subsequent production of each
variety exhibits constant returns to scale. While it may decide to produce more than one variety,
each rm has one key variety corresponding to its `core competency'. This is associated with a
core marginal cost c (equal to unit labor requirement).6 Research and development yield uncertain
outcomes for c, and rms learn about this cost level only after making the irreversible investment
fE required for entry. We model this as a draw from a common (and known) distribution G(c)
with support on [0;cM].
A rm can introduce any number of new varieties, but each additional variety entails an addi-
tional customization cost as it pulls a rm away from its core competency. This entails incrementally
higher marginal costs of production for those varieties. The divergence from a rm's core compe-
tency may also be reected in diminished product quality/appeal. For simplicity, we maintain
product symmetry on the demand side and capture any decrease in product appeal as an increased
5This welfare measure reects the reduced consumption of the numeraire to account for the labor resources used
to cover the entry costs.
6We use the same concept of a rm's core competency as Eckel and Neary (2010). For simplicity, we do not model
any xed production costs. This would signicantly increase the complexity of our model without yielding much new
insight.
6production cost. We refer to this incremental production cost as a customization cost.
We index by m the varieties produced by the same rm in increasing order of distance from
their core competency m = 0 (the rm's core variety). We then denote v(m;c) the marginal cost
for variety m produced by a rm with core marginal cost c and assume v(m;c) = ! mc with
! 2 (0;1). This denes a rm-level `competence ladder' with geometrically increasing customiza-
tion costs. This modeling approach is isomorphic to one where we label the product ladder as
reecting decreasing quality/product appeal and insert the geometric term as a preference param-
eter multiplying quantities in the utility function (1). Our modeling approach also nests the case
of single-product rms as the geometric step size becomes arbitrarily large (! goes to zero); rms
will then only be able to produce their core variety.
Since the entry cost is sunk, rms that can cover the marginal cost of their core variety survive
and produce. All other rms exit the industry. Surviving rms maximize their prots using the
residual demand function (3). In so doing, those rms take the average price level  p and total
number of varieties M as given. This monopolistic competition outcome is maintained with multi-
product rms as any rm can only produce a countable number of products, which is a subset of
measure zero of the total mass of varieties M.
The prot maximizing price p(v) and output level q(v) of a variety with cost v must then satisfy
q(v) =
L

[p(v)   v]: (6)
The prot maximizing price p(v) may be above the price bound pmax from (4), in which case the
variety is not supplied. Let vD reference the cuto cost for a variety to be protably produced. This
variety earns zero prot as its price is driven down to its marginal cost, p(vD) = vD = pmax, and
its demand level q(vD) is driven to zero. Let r(v) = p(v)q(v), (v) = r(v)   q(v)v, (v) = p(v)   v
denote the revenue, prot, and (absolute) markup of a variety with cost v. All these performance
7measures can then be written as functions of v and vD only:7
p(v) =
1
2
(vD + v); (7)
(v) =
1
2
(vD   v);
q(v) =
L
2
(vD   v);
r(v) =
L
4
h
(vD)
2   v2
i
;
(v) =
L
4
(vD   v)
2 :
The threshold cost vD thus summarizes the competitive environment for the performance mea-
sures of all produced varieties. As expected, lower cost varieties have lower prices and earn higher
revenues and prots than varieties with higher costs. However, lower cost varieties do not pass on
all of the cost dierential to consumers in the form of lower prices: they also have higher markups
(in both absolute and relative terms) than varieties with higher costs.8
Firms with core competency v > vD cannot protably produce their core variety and exit.
Hence, cD = vD is also the cuto for rm survival and measures the `toughness' of competition in
the market: it is a sucient statistic for all performance measures across varieties and rms.9 We
assume that cM is high enough that it is always above cD, so exit rates are always positive. All
rms with core cost c < cD earn positive prots (gross of the entry cost) on their core varieties
and remain in the industry. Some rms will also earn positive prots from the introduction of
additional varieties. In particular, rms with cost c such that v(m;c)  vD () c  !mcD earn
positive prots on their m-th additional variety and thus produce at least m + 1 varieties. The
total number of varieties produced by a rm with cost c is
M(c) =
8
<
:
0 if c > cD,
maxfm j c  !mcDg + 1 if c  cD.
(8)
which is (weakly) decreasing for all c 2 [0;cM]. Accordingly, the number of varieties produced by a
7Given the absence of cannibalization motive, these variety level performance measures are identical to the single
product case studied in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). This tractability allows us to analytically solve the closed and
open equilibria with heterogenous rms (and asymmetric countries in the open economy).
8De Loecker et al. (2012) nd empirical support for these properties, both across and within rms, in the case of
Indian multi-product rms.
9We will see shortly how the average price of all varieties and the number of varieties is uniquely pinned-down by
this cuto.
8rm with cost c is indeed an integer number (and not a mass with positive measure). This number
is an increasing step function of the rm's productivity 1=c, as depicted in Figure 1 below. Firms
with higher core productivity thus produce (weakly) more varieties.
c
−1
Mc
cD
−1 cD
−1 
2cD
−1 
3cD
−1
1
2
3
4
Figure 1: Number of Varieties Produced as a Function of Firm Productivity
Given a mass of entrants NE, the distribution of costs across all varieties is determined by the
optimal rm product range choice M(c) as well as the distribution of core competencies G(c). Let
Mv(v) denote the measure function for varieties (the measure of varieties produced at cost v or
lower, given NE entrants). Further dene H(v)  Mv(v)=NE as the normalized measure of varieties
per unit mass of entrants. Then H(v) =
P1
m=0 G(!mv) and is exogenously determined from G(:)
and !. Given a unit mass of entrants, there will be a mass G(v) of varieties with cost v or less; a
mass G(!v) of rst additional varieties (with cost v or less); a mass G(!2v) of second additional
varieties; and so forth. The measure H(v) sums over all these varieties.
2.3 Free Entry and Equilibrium
Prior to entry, the expected rm prot is
R cD
0 (c)dG(c)   fE where
(c) 
M(c) 1 X
m=0
 (v (m;c)) (9)
9denotes the prot of a rm with cost c. If this prot were negative for all c's, no rms would
enter the industry. As long as some rms produce, the expected prot is driven to zero by the
unrestricted entry of new rms. This yields the equilibrium free entry condition:
Z cD
0
(c)dG(c) =
Z cD
0
2
4
X
fmj! mccDg

 
! mc

3
5dG(c) (10)
=
1 X
m=0
Z !mcD
0

 
! mc

dG(c)

= fE;
where the second equality rst averages over the mth produced variety by all rms, then sums over
m.
The free entry condition (10) determines the cost cuto cD = vD. This cuto, in turn, deter-
mines the aggregate mass of varieties, since vD = p(vD) must also be equal to the zero demand
price threshold in (4):
vD =
1
M + 
( + M p):
The aggregate mass of varieties is then
M =
2

   vD
vD   v
;
where the average cost of all varieties
v =
1
M
vD Z
0
vdMv(v) =
1
NEH(vD)
vD Z
0
vNEdH(v) =
1
H(vD)
vD Z
0
vdH(v)
depends only on vD.10 Similarly, this cuto also uniquely pins down the average price across all
varieties:
 p =
1
M
vD Z
0
p(v)dMv(v) =
1
H(vD)
vD Z
0
p(v)dH(v):
Finally, the mass of entrants is given by NE = M=H(vD), which can in turn be used to obtain the
mass of producing rms N = NEG(cD).
10We also use the relationship between average cost and price  v = 2 p   vD; which is obtained from (7).
102.4 Parametrization of Technology
All the results derived so far hold for any distribution of core cost draws G(c). However, in order
to simplify some of the ensuing analysis, we use a specic parametrization for this distribution.
In particular, we assume that core productivity draws 1=c follow a Pareto distribution with lower
productivity bound 1=cM and shape parameter k  1. This implies a distribution of cost draws c
given by
G(c) =

c
cM
k
; c 2 [0;cM]: (11)
The shape parameter k indexes the dispersion of cost draws. When k = 1, the cost distribution is
uniform on [0;cM]. As k increases, the relative number of high cost rms increases, and the cost
distribution is more concentrated at these higher cost levels. As k goes to innity, the distribution
becomes degenerate at cM. Any truncation of the cost distribution from above will retain the same
distribution function and shape parameter k. The productivity distribution of surviving rms
will therefore also be Pareto with shape k, and the truncated cost distribution will be given by
GD(c) = (c=cD)
k ; c 2 [0;cD].
When core competencies are distributed Pareto, then all produced varieties will share the same
Pareto distribution:
H(c) =
1 X
m=0
G(!mc) = 
G(c); (12)
where 
 =
 
1   !k 1 > 1 is an index of multi-product exibility (which varies monotonically with
!). In equilibrium, this index will also be equal to the average number of products produced across
all surviving rms:
M
N
=
H(vD)NE
G(cD)NE
= 
:
The Pareto parametrization also yields a simple closed-form solution for the cost cuto cD from
the free entry condition (10):
cD =


L

 1
k+2
; (13)
where   2(k + 1)(k + 2)(cM)
k fE is a technology index that combines the eects of bet-
ter distribution of cost draws (lower cM) and lower entry costs fE. We assume that cM >
p
[2(k + 1)(k + 2)fE]=(L
) in order to ensure cD < cM as was previously anticipated. We
also note that, as the customization cost for non-core varieties becomes innitely large (! ! 0),
multi-product exibility 
 goes to 1, and (13) then boils down to the single-product case studied
11by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
2.5 Equilibrium with Multi-Product Firms
Equation (13) summarizes how technology (referenced by the distribution of cost draws and the sunk
entry cost), market size, product dierentiation, and multi-product exibility aect the toughness
of competition in the market equilibrium. Increases in market size, technology improvements (a fall
in cM or fE), and increases in product substitutability (a rise in ) all lead to tougher competition
in the market and thus to an equilibrium with a lower cost cuto cD. As multi-product exibility

 increases, rms respond by introducing more products. This additional production is skewed
towards the better performing rms and also leads to tougher competition and a lower cD cuto.
A market with tougher competition (lower cD) also features more product variety M and a lower
average price  p (due to the combined eect of product selection towards lower cost varieties and of
lower markups). Both of these contribute to higher welfare U. Given our Pareto parametrization,
we can write all of these variables as simple closed form functions of the cost cuto cD:
M =
2(k + 1)

   cD
cD
;  p =
2k + 1
2k + 2
cD; U = 1 +
1
2
(   cD)

  
k + 1
k + 2
cD

: (14)
Increases in the toughness of competition do not aect the average number of varieties produced
per rm M=N = 
 because the mass of surviving rms N rises by the same proportion as the mass
of produced varieties M.11 However, each rm responds to tougher competition by dropping its
worst performing varieties (highest m) and reducing the number of varieties produced M(c).12 The
selection of rms with respect to exit explains how the average number of products produced per
rm can remain constant: exiting rms are those with the highest cost c who produce the fewest
number of products.
3 Competition, Product Mix, and Productivity
We now investigate the link between toughness of competition and productivity at both the rm
and aggregate level. We just described how tougher competition aects the selection of both rms
11This exact osetting eect between the number of rms and the number of products is driven by our functional
form assumptions. However, the downward shift in M(c) in response to competition (described next) holds for a
much more general set of parameterizations.
12To be precise, the number of produced varieties M(c) weakly decreases: if the change in the cuto cD is small
enough, then some rms may still produce the same number of varieties. For other rms with high cost c, M(c) drops
to zero which implies rm exit.
12in a market, and of the products they produce: high cost rms exit, and rms drop their high
cost products. These selection eects induce productivity improvements at both the rm and the
aggregate level.13
However, our model features an important additional channel that links tougher competition to
higher rm and aggregate productivity. This new channel operates through the eect of competition
on a rm's product mix. Tougher competition induces multi-product rms to skew production
towards their better performing varieties (closer to their core competency). Thus, holding a multi-
product rm's product range xed, an increase in competition leads to an increase in that rm's
productivity. Aggregating across rms, this product mix response also generates an aggregate
productivity gain from tougher competition, over and above the eects from rm and product
selection.
We have not yet dened how rm and aggregate productivity are measured. We start with the
aggregation of output, revenue, and cost (employment) at the rm level. For any rm c, this is
simply the sum of output, revenue, and cost over all varieties produced:
Q(c) 
M(c) 1 X
m=0
q (v (m;c)); R(c) 
M(c) 1 X
m=0
r(v (m;c)); C(c) 
M(c) 1 X
m=0
v (m;c)q (v (m;c)): (15)
One measure of rm productivity is simply output per worker (c)  Q(c)=C(c). This produc-
tivity measure does not have a clear empirical counterpart for multi-product rms, as output units
for each product are normalized so that one unit of each product generates the same utility for the
consumer (this is the implicit normalization behind the product symmetry in the utility function).
A rm's deated sales per worker R(c) 

R(c)=  P

=C(c) provides another productivity measure
that has a clear empirical counterpart. For this productivity measure, we need to dene the price
deator  P. We choose
 P 
R cD
0 R(c)dG(c)
R cD
0 Q(c)dG(c)
=
k + 1
k + 2
cD:
This is the average of all the variety prices p(v) weighted by their output share. We could also
have used the unweighted price average  p that we previously dened, or an average weighted by a
variety's revenue share (i.e. its market share) instead of output share. In our model, all of these
price averages only dier by a multiplicative constant, so the eects of competition (changes in
13This eect of product scope on rm productivity is emphasized by Bernard et al (2011) and Eckel and Neary
(2010).
13the cuto cD) on productivity will not depend on this choice of price averages.14 We dene the
aggregate counterparts to our two rm productivity measures as industry output per worker and
industry deated sales per worker:
  
R cD
0 Q(c)dG(c)
R cD
0 C(c)dG(c)
;  R =
R cD
0 R(c)dG(c)

=  P
R cD
0 C(c)dG(c)
:
Our choice of the price deator  P then implies that these two aggregate productivity measures
coincide:15
  =  R =
k + 2
k
1
cD
: (16)
Equation (16) summarizes the overall eect of tougher competition on aggregate productivity
gains. This aggregate response of productivity combines the eects of competition on both rm
productivity and inter-rm reallocations (including entry and exit). We now detail how tougher
competition induces improvements in rm productivity through its impact on a rm's product
mix. In appendix B, we show that both rm productivity measures, (c) and R(c); increase for
all multi-product rms when competition increases (cD decreases). The key component of this
proof is that, holding a rm's product scope constant (a given number M > 1 of non-core varieties
produced), rm productivity over that product scope (output or deated sales of those M products
per worker producing those products) increases whenever competition increases. This eect of
competition on rm productivity, by construction, is entirely driven by the response of the rm's
product mix.
To isolate this product mix response to competition, consider two varieties m and m0 produced
by a rm with cost c. Assume that m < m0 so that variety m is closer to the core. The ratio of
the rm's output of the two varieties is given by
q(v (m;c))
q(v (m0;c))
=
cD   ! mc
cD   ! m0c
:
As competition increases (cD decreases), this ratio increases, implying that the rm skews its
production towards its core varieties. This happens because the increased competition increases
the price elasticity of demand for all products. At a constant relative price p(v(m;c))=p(v(m0;c)),
the higher price elasticity translates into higher relative demand q(v(m;c))=q(v(m0;c)) and sales
14As we previously reported in equation (14), the unweighted price average is  p = [(2k + 1)=(2k + 2)]cD; and the
average weighted by market share is [(6k + 2k
2 + 3)=(2k
2 + 8k + 6)]cD.
15If we had picked one of the other price averages, the two aggregate productivity measures would dier by a
multiplicative constant.
14r(v(m;c))=r(v(m0;c)) for good m (relative to m0).16 In our specic demand parametrization, there
is a further increase in relative demand and sales, because markups drop more for good m than
m0, which implies that the relative price p(v(m;c))=p(v(m0;c)) decreases.17 It is this reallocation
of output towards better performing products (also mirrored by a reallocation of production labor
towards those products) that generates the productivity increases within the rm. In other words,
tougher competition skews the distribution of employment, output, and sales towards the better
performing varieties (closer to the core), while it attens the rm's distribution of prices.
In the open economy version of our model that we develop in the next section, we show how
rms respond to tougher competition in export markets in very similar ways by skewing their
exported product mix towards their better performing products. Our empirical results conrm a
strong eect of such a link between competition and product mix.
4 Open Economy
We now turn to the open economy in order to examine how market size and geography determine
dierences in the toughness of competition across markets { and how the latter translates into
dierences in the exporters' product mix. We allow for an arbitrary number of countries and
asymmetric trade costs. Let J denote the number of countries, indexed by l = 1;:::;J. The
markets are segmented, although any produced variety can be exported from country l to country
h subject to an iceberg trade cost lh > 1. Thus, the delivered cost for variety m exported to
country h by a rm with core competency c in country l is lhv(m;c) = lh! mc.
4.1 Equilibrium with Asymmetric Countries
Let pmax
l denote the price threshold for positive demand in market l. Then (4) implies
pmax
l =
1
Ml + 
( + Ml pl); (17)
where Ml is the total number of products selling in country l (the total number of domestic and
exported varieties) and  pl is their average price. Let ll(v) and lh(v) represent the maximized
value of prots from domestic and export sales to country h for a variety with cost v produced in
country l. (We use the subscript ll to denote \domestic" variables, pertaining to rms located in
16For the result on relative sales, we are assuming that the price elasticity of demand (") is larger than one.
17Good m closer to the core initially has a higher markup than good m
0; see (7) .
15l.) The cost cutos for protable domestic production and for protable exports must satisfy:
vll = supfc : ll(v) > 0g = pmax
l ;
vlh = supfc : lh(v) > 0g =
pmax
h
lh
;
(18)
and thus vlh = vhh=lh. As was the case in the closed economy, the cuto vll, l = 1;:::;J, summarizes
all the eects of market conditions in country l relevant for all rm performance measures. The
prot functions can then be written as a function of these cutos (assuming that markets are
segmented, as in Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008):
ll(v) =
Ll
4
(vll   v)
2 ;
lh(v) =
Lh
4
2
lh (vlh   v)
2 =
Lh
4
(vhh   lhv)
2 :
(19)
As in the closed economy, cll = vll will be the cuto for rm survival in country l (cuto for
domestic sales of rms producing in l). Similarly, clh = vlh will be the rm export cuto from l to h
(no rm with c > clh can protably export any varieties from l to h). A rm with core competency
c will produce all varieties m such that ll (v(m;c))  0; it will export to h the subset of varieties
m such that lh (v(m;c))  0. The total number of varieties produced and exported to h by a rm
with cost c in country l are thus
Mll(c) =
8
<
:
0 if c > cll,
maxfm j c  !mcllg + 1 if c  cll,
Mlh(c) =
8
<
:
0 if c > clh,
maxfm j c  !mclhg + 1 if c  clh.
We can then dene a rm's total domestic and export prots by aggregating over these varieties:
ll(c) =
Mll(c) 1 X
m=0
ll (v (m;c)); lh(c) =
Mlh(c) 1 X
m=0
lh (v (m;c)):
Entry is unrestricted in all countries. Firms choose a production location prior to entry and paying
the sunk entry cost. We assume that the entry cost fE and cost distribution G(c) are common
across countries (although this can be relaxed).18 We maintain our Pareto parametrization (11)
18Dierences in the support for this distribution could also be introduced as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
16for this distribution. A prospective entrant's expected prots will then be given by
Z cll
0
ll(c)dG(c) +
X
h6=l
Z clh
0
lh(c)dG(c)
=
1 X
m=0
Z !mcll
0
ll
 
! mc

dG(c)

+
X
h6=l
1 X
m=0
Z !mclh
0
lh
 
! mc

dG(c)

=
1
2(k + 1)(k + 2)ck
M
2
4Ll
ck+2
ll +
X
h6=l
Lh
2
lhck+2
lh
3
5
=


2(k + 1)(k + 2)ck
M
2
4Llck+2
ll +
X
h6=l
Lh k
lh ck+2
hh
3
5:
Setting the expected prot equal to the entry cost yields the free entry conditions:
J X
h=1
lhLhck+2
hh =



l = 1;:::;J: (20)
where lh   k
lh < 1 is a measure of `freeness' of trade from country l to country h that varies
inversely with the trade costs lh. The technology index  is the same as in the closed economy
case.
The free entry conditions (20) yield a system of J equations that can be solved for the J
equilibrium domestic cutos using Cramer's rule:
chh =
 



PJ
l=1 jClhj
jPj
1
Lh
! 1
k+2
; (21)
where jPj is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix
P 
0
B B
B B
B B
@
1 12  1M
21 1  2M
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
M1 M2  1
1
C C
C C
C C
A
;
and jClhj is the cofactor of its lh element. Cross-country dierences in cutos now arise from two
sources: own country size (Lh) and geographical remoteness, captured by
PJ
l=1 jClhj=jPj. Central
countries beneting from a large local market have lower cutos, and exhibit tougher competition
than peripheral countries with a small local market.
17As in the closed economy, the threshold price condition in country h (17), along with the
resulting Pareto distribution of all prices for varieties sold in h (domestic prices and export prices
have an identical distribution in country h) yield a zero-cuto prot condition linking the variety
cuto vhh = chh to the mass of varieties sold in country h :
Mh =
2(k + 1)

   chh
chh
: (22)
Given a positive mass of entrants NE;l in country l, there will be G(clh)NE;l rms exporting

lhG(clh)NE;l varieties to country h: Summing over all these varieties (including those produced
and sold in h) yields19
J X
l=1
lhNE;l =
Mh

ck
hh
:
The latter provides a system of J linear equations that can be solved for the number of entrants in
the J countries using Cramer's rule:20
NE;l =


 (k + 2)fE
J X
h=1
(   chh)
ck+1
hh
jClhj
jPj
: (23)
As in the closed economy, the cuto level completely summarizes the distribution of prices as well
as all the other performance measures. Hence, the cuto in each country also uniquely determines
welfare in that country. The relationship between welfare and the cuto is the same as in the closed
economy (see (14)).
4.2 Bilateral Trade Patterns with Firm and Product Selection
We have now completely characterized the multi-country open economy equilibrium. Selection
operates at many dierent margins: a subset of rms survive in each country, and a smaller subset
of those export to any given destination. Within a rm, there is an endogenous selection of its
product range (the range of product produced); those products are all sold on the rm's domestic
market, but only a subset of those products are sold in each export market. In order to keep our
multi-country open economy model as tractable as possible, we have assumed a single bilateral trade
cost lh that does not vary across rms or products. This simplication implies some predictions
regarding the ordering of the selection process across countries and products that is overly rigid.
19Recall that chh = lhclh:
20We use the properties that relate the freeness matrix P and its transpose in terms of determinants and cofactors.
18Since lh does not vary across rms in l contemplating exports to h, then all those rms would
face the same ranking of export market destinations based on the toughness of competition in
that market, chh, and the trade cost to that market lh: All exporters would then export to the
country with the highest chh=lh, and then move down the country destination list in decreasing
order of this ratio until exports to the next destination were no longer protable. This generates
a \pecking order" of export destinations for exporters from a given country l. Eaton, Kortum,
and Kramarz (2011) show that there is such a stable ranking of export destinations for French
exporters. Needless to say, the empirical prediction for the ordered set of export destinations is
not strictly adhered to by every French exporter (some export to a given destination without also
exporting to all the other higher ranked destinations). Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz formally show
how some idiosyncratic noise in the bilateral trading cost can explain those departures from the
dominant ranking of export destinations. They also show that the empirical regularities for the
ranking of export destinations are so strong that one can easily reject the notion of independent
export destination choices by rms.
Our model features a similar rigid ordering within a rm regarding the products exported across
destinations. Without any variation in the bilateral trade cost lh across products, an exporter from
l would always exactly follow its domestic core competency ladder when determining the range of
products exported across destinations: an exporter would never export variety m0 > m unless it
also exported variety m to any given destination. Just as we described for the prediction of country
rankings, we clearly do not expect the empirical prediction for product rankings to hold exactly
for all rms. Nevertheless, a similar empirical pattern emerges highlighting a stable ranking of
products for each exporter across export destinations.21 We empirically describe the substantial
extent of this ranking stability for French exporters in our next section.
Putting together all the dierent margins of trade, we can use our model to generate predictions
for aggregate bilateral trade. An exporter in country l with core competency c generates export
sales of variety m to country h equal to (assuming that this variety is exported):
rlh(v(m;c)) =
Lh
4
h
v2
hh   (lhv(m;c))
2
i
: (24)
21Bernard et al (2011) and Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) report that there is such a stable ordering of a rm's
product line for U.S. and Brazilian rms.
19Aggregate bilateral trade from l to h is then:
EXPlh = NE;l
lh
Z clh
0
rlh(v(m;c))dG(v)
=


2 (k + 2)ck
M
 NE;l  ck+2
hh Lh  lh: (25)
Thus, aggregate bilateral trade follows a standard gravity specication based on country xed
eects (separate xed eects for the exporter and importer) and a bilateral term that captures the
eects of all bilateral barriers/enhancers to trade.22
5 Exporters' Product Mix Across Destinations
We previously described how, in the closed economy, rms respond to increases in competition in
their market by skewing their product mix towards their core products. We also analyzed how this
product mix response generated increases in rm productivity. We now show how dierences in
competition across export market destinations induce exporters to those markets to respond in very
similar ways: when exporting to markets with tougher competition, exporters skew their product
level exports towards their core products. We proceed in a similar way as we did for the closed
economy by examining a given rm's ratio of exports of two products m0 and m, where m is closer
to the core. In anticipation of our empirical work, we write the ratio of export sales (revenue not
output), but the ratio of export quantities responds to competition in identical ways. Using (24),
we can write this sales ratio:
rlh(v (m;c))
rlh(v (m0;c))
=
c2
hh   (lh! mc)
2
c2
hh   (lh! m0c)
2: (26)
Tougher competition in an export market (lower chh) increases this ratio, which captures how
rms skew their exports toward their core varieties (recall that m0 > m so variety m is closer to
the core). The intuition behind this result is very similar to the one we described for the closed
economy. Tougher competition in a market increases the price elasticity of demand for all goods
exported to that market. As in the closed economy, this skews relative demand and relative export
sales towards the goods closer to the core. In our empirical work, we focus on measuring this eect
22This type of structural gravity specication with country xed-eects is generated by a large set of dierent
modeling frameworks. See Feenstra (2004) for further discussion of this topic. In (25), we do not further substitute
out the endogenous number of entrants and cost cuto based on (21) and (23). This would lead to just a dierent
functional form for the country xed eects.
20of tougher competition across export market destinations on a rm's exported product mix.
We could also use (26) to make predictions regarding the impact of the bilateral trade cost lh
on a rm's exported product mix: Higher trade costs raise the rm's delivered cost and lead to a
higher export ratio. The higher delivered cost increase the competition faced by an exporting rm,
as it then competes against domestic rms that benet from a greater cost advantage. However,
this comparative static is very sensitive to the specication for the trade cost across a rm's product
ladder. If trade barriers induce disproportionately higher trade costs on products further away from
the core, then the direction of this comparative static would be reversed. Furthermore, identifying
the independent eect of trade barriers on the exporters' product mix would also require micro-level
data for exporters located in many dierent countries (to generate variation across both origin and
destination of export sales). Our data `only' covers the export patterns for French exporters, and
does not give us this variation in origin country. For these reasons, we do not emphasize the eect
of trade barriers on the product mix of exporters. In our empirical work, we will only seek to
control for a potential correlation between bilateral trade barriers with respect to France and the
level of competition in destination countries served by French exporters.23
As was the case for the closed economy, the skewing of a rm's product mix towards core
varieties also entails increases in rm productivity. Empirically, we cannot separately measure
a rm's productivity with respect to its production for each export market. However, we can
theoretically dene such a productivity measure in an analogous way to (c)  Q(c)=C(c) for the
closed economy. We thus dene the productivity of rm c in l for its exports to destination h as
lh(c)  Qlh(c)=Clh(c); where Qlh(c) are the total units of output that rm c exports to h, and
Clh(c) are the total labor costs incurred by rm c to produce those units.24 In appendix B, we show
that this export market-specic productivity measure (as well as the associated measure R;lh(c)
based on deated sales) increases with the toughness of competition in that export market. In other
words, lh(c) and R;lh(c) both increase when chh decreases. Thus, changes in exported product
mix also have important repercussions for rm productivity.
23The theoretical implications of our model for trade liberalization are discussed in appendix A.
24In order for this productivity measure to aggregate up to overall country productivity, we incorporate the pro-
ductivity of the transportation/trade cost sector into this productivity measure. This implies that rm c employs the
labor units that are used to produce the \melted" units of output that cover the trade cost; those labor units are thus
included in Clh(c). The output of rm c is measured as valued-added, which implies that those \melted" units are
not included in Qlh(c) (the latter are the number of units produced by rm c that are consumed in h). Separating out
the productivity of the transportation sector would not aect our main comparative static with respect to toughness
of competition in the export market.
216 Empirical Analysis
6.1 Skewness of Exported Product Mix
We now test the main prediction of our model regarding the impact of competition across export
market destinations on a rm's exported product mix. Our model predicts that tougher compe-
tition in an export market will induce rms to lower markups on all their exported products and
therefore skew their export sales towards their best performing products. We thus need data on a
rm's exports across products and destinations. We use comprehensive rm-level data on annual
shipments by all French exporters to all countries in the world for a set of more than 10,000 goods.
Firm-level exports are collected by French customs and include export sales for each 8-digit (com-
bined nomenclature) product by destination country.25 Since we are interested in the cross-section
of rm-product exports across destinations, we restrict our sample to a single year, for 2003 (this
is the last year of our available data; results obtained from other years are very similar). The
reporting criteria for all rms operating in the French metropolitan territory are as follows: For
within EU exports, the rm's annual trade value exceeds 100,000 Euros;26 and for exports outside
the EU, the exported value to a destination exceeds 1,000 Euros or a weight of a ton. Despite
these limitations, the database is nearly comprehensive. In 2003, 100,033 rms report exports
across 229 destination countries (or territories) for 10,072 products. This represents data on over
2 million shipments. We restrict our analysis to export data in manufacturing industries, mostly
eliminating rms in the service and wholesale/distribution sector to ensure that rms take part in
the production of the goods they export.27 This leaves us with data on over a million shipments
by rms in the whole range of manufacturing sectors. We also drop observations for rms that
the French national statistical institute reports as having an aliate abroad. This avoids the issue
that multinational rms may substitute exports of some of their best performing products with
aliate production in the destination country (following the export versus FDI trade-o described
in Helpman et al (2004)). We therefore limit our analysis to rms that do not have this possibility,
in order to reduce noise in the product export rankings.
In order to measure the skewness of a rm's exported product mix across destinations, we rst
25We thank the French customs administration and CNIS for making this data available to researchers at CEPII.
Since this product-level data is collected by customs at the border, we unfortunately do not have access to data on
a rm's sales by product on the French domestic market.
26If that threshold is not met, rms can choose to report under a simplied scheme without supplying export des-
tinations. However, in practice, many rms under that threshold report the detailed export destination information.
27Some large distributors such as Carrefour account for a disproportionate number of annual shipments.
22need to make some assumptions regarding the empirical measurement of a rm's product ladder.
We start with the most direct counterpart to our theoretical model, which assumes that the rm's
product ladder does not vary across destinations. For this measure, we rank all the products
exported by a rm according to the value of exports to the world, and use this ranking as an
indicator for the product rank m.28 We call this the rm's global product rank. An alternative
is to measure a rm's product rank for each destination based on the rm's exports sales to that
destination. We call this the rm's local product rank. Empirically, this local product ranking can
vary across destinations. However, as we alluded to earlier, this local product ranking is remarkably
stable across destinations.
The Spearman rank correlation between a rm's local and global rankings (in each export
market destination) is .68.29 Naturally, this correlation might be partly driven by rms that export
only one product to one market, for which the global rank has to be equal to the local rank. In
Table 1, we therefore report the rank correlation as we gradually restrict the sample to rms that
export many products to many markets. The bottom line is that this correlation remains quite
stable: for rms exporting more than 50 products to more than 50 destinations, the correlation is
still .58. Another possibility is that this correlation is dierent across destination income levels.
Restricting the sample to the top 50 or 20% richest importers hardly changes this correlation (.69
and .71 respectively).30 Table 1 does not directly control for product selection, whereby any product
that is not exported to a destination is dropped from the local ranking. Although we do not use
this extensive margin response, we show in Appendix E that this product selection into the local
ranking is also strongly correlated with the product's global ranking for the rm: Products with
lower global ranking are exported to fewer destinations (on average, the second ranked product is
exported to 5 fewer destinations; see Appendix E for details).
Although high, this correlation still highlights substantial departures from a steady global prod-
uct ladder. A natural alternative is therefore to use the local product rank when measuring the
skewness of a rm's exported product mix. In this interpretation, the identity of the core (or other
rank number) product can change across destinations. We thus use both the rm's global and local
product rank to construct the rm's destination-specic export sales ratio rlh(v(m;c))=rlh(v(m0;c))
28We experimented ranking products for each rm based on the number of export destinations; and obtained very
similar results to the ranking based on global export sales.
29Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) also report a huge amount of stability in the local rankings across destinations.
The Spearman rank coecient they report is .837. Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) report a rank correlation of .76
between home and export sales of Mexican rms.
30We nevertheless separately report our regression results for those restricted sample of countries based on income.
23Table 1: Spearman Correlations Between Global and Local Rankings
Firms exporting at least: # products
to # countries 1 2 5 10 50
1 67.93% 67.78% 67.27% 66.26% 59.39%
2 67.82% 67.74% 67.28% 66.28% 59.39%
5 67.55% 67.51% 67.2% 66.3% 59.43%
10 67.02% 67% 66.82% 66.12% 59.46%
50 61.66% 61.66% 61.64% 61.53% 58.05%
for m < m0: Since many rms export few products to many destinations, increasing the higher prod-
uct rank m0 disproportionately reduces the number of available rm/destination observations. For
most of our analysis, we pick m = 0 (core product) and m0 = 1, but also report results for m0 = 2.31
Thus, we construct the ratio of a rm's export sales to every destination for its best performing
product (either globally, or in each destination) relative to its next best performing product (again,
either globally, or in each destination). The local ratios can be computed so long as a rm exports
at least two products to a destination (or three when m0 = 2). The global ratios can be computed
so long as a rm exports its top (in terms of world exports) two products to a destination. We
thus obtain these measures that are rm c and destination h specic, so long as those criteria are
met (there is no variation in origin l = France). We use those ratios in logs, so that they represent
percentage dierences in export sales. We refer to the ratios as either local or global, based on
the ranking method used to compute them. Lastly, we also constrain the sample so that the two
products considered belong to the same 2-digit product category (there are 97 such categories).
This eliminates ratios based on products that are in completely dierent sectors; however, this
restriction hardly impacts our reported results.
We construct a third set of measures that seeks to capture changes in skewness of a rm's
exported product mix over the entire range of exported products (instead of being conned to the
top two or three products). We use several dierent skewness statistics for the distribution of rm
export sales to a destination: the standard deviation of log export sales, a Herndhal index, and
a Theil index (a measure of entropy). Since these statistics are independent of the identity of the
products exported to a destination, they are \local" by nature, and do not have any global ranking
counterpart. These statistics can be computed for every rm-destination combination where the
rm exports two or more products.
As we discussed in the introduction, we focus our empirical analysis on the response of the
31We also obtain very similar results for m = 1 and m
0 = 2.
24exported product mix (intensive margin) and do not investigate our model's prediction for the
extensive margin across destinations. Empirically, the number of products exported is under-
reported due to a minimum sales reporting threshold. Theoretically, the predictions for the response
of the extensive margin is quite sensitive to the specication of xed exporting costs (which could
be either destination-specic, or product-destination-specic, or some combination of both). We
abstract from these xed costs in order to maintain the tractability of our model in an asymmetric
multi-country setting.32 As we previously noted, xed export costs aect the extensive margin
responses; but conditional on a rm's decision to export a given set of products, those costs would
not aect our skewness measures for the rms' exported product mix. Our main novel prediction
concerns how this skewness varies across export market destinations.
6.2 Toughness of Competition Across Destinations and Bilateral Controls
Our theoretical model predicts that the toughness of competition in a destination is determined
by that destination's size, and by its geography (proximity to other big countries). We control
for country size using GDP expressed in a common currency at market exchange rates. We now
seek a control for the geography of a destination that does not rely on country-level data for that
destination. We use the supply potential concept introduced by Redding and Venables (2004) as
such a control. In words, the supply potential is the aggregate predicted exports to a destination
based on a bilateral trade gravity equation (in logs) with both exporter and importer xed eects
and the standard bilateral measures of trade barriers/enhancers. We construct a related measure of
a destination's foreign supply potential that does not use the importer's xed eect when predicting
aggregate exports to that destination. By construction, foreign supply potential is thus uncorrelated
with the importer's xed-eect. It is closely related to the construction of a country's market
potential (which seeks to capture a measure of predicted import demand for a country). The
construction of the supply potential measures is discussed in greater detail in Redding and Venables
(2004); we use the foreign supply measure for the year 2003 from Head and Mayer (2011) who
extend the analysis to many more countries and more years of data.33 Since we only work with
32Absent xed exporting costs, our theoretical model predicts that a given rm exports fewer products to desti-
nations where competition is tougher. However, a given rm would still export more products above a given sales
threshold to larger destinations, even though competition is tougher there. Empirically, we observe that French rms
report exporting more products to larger destinations (higher GDP). This could be due in part to the reporting
threshold for exports, but is also a likely indication that destination-specic xed export costs play an important role
in determining the extensive margin of trade.
33As is the case with market potential, a country's supplier potential is strongly correlated with that country's
GDP: big trading economies tend to be located near one-another. The supply potential data is available online at
25the foreign supply potential measure, we drop the qualier `foreign' when we subsequently refer
to this variable. There are likely several other country characteristics that aect competition in a
destination. As a robustness check, we also use the number of French exporters to a destination
as a measure of competition for French rms in that market; this measure combines the eects of
both destination size and geography as well as other destination characteristics that impact the
extent of competition for French exporters. Those robustness results are reported in Appendix D.
We also use a set of controls for bilateral trade barriers/enhancers ( in our model) between
France and the destination country: distance, contiguity, colonial links, common-language, and
dummies for membership of Regional Trading Agreements, GATT/WTO, and a common currency
area (the eurozone in this case).34
6.3 Results
Before reporting the regression results of the skewness measures on the destination country mea-
sures, we rst show some scatter plots for the global ratio against both destination country GDP
and our measure of supply potential. These are displayed in Figures 2 and 3. For each destination,
we use the mean global ratio across exporting rms. Since the rm-level measure is very noisy, the
precision of the mean increases with the number of available rm data points (for each destination).
We rst show the scatter plots using all available destinations, with symbol weights proportional
to the number of available rm observations, and then again dropping any destination with fewer
than 250 exporting rms.35 Those scatter plots show a very strong positive correlation between the
export share ratios and the measures of toughness of competition in the destination. Absent any
variation in the toughness of competition across destinations { such as in a world with monopolistic
competition and C.E.S. preferences where markups are exogenously xed { the variation in the rel-
ative export shares should be white noise. The data clearly show that variations in competition (at
least as proxied by country size and supplier potential) are strong enough to induce large variations
in the rms' relative export sales across destinations. Scatter plots for the local ratio and Theil
index look very similar.
We now turn to our regression analysis using the three skewness measures. Each observation
summarizes the skewness of export sales for a given rm to a given destination. Since we seek to
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/marketpotentials.htm
34All those variables are available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm
35Increasing that threshold level for the number of exporters slightly increases the t and slope of the regression
line through the scatter plot.
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Figure 2: Mean Global Ratio and Destination Country GDP in 2003
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27uncover variation in that skewness for a given rm, we include rm xed eects throughout. Our
remaining independent variables are destination specic: our two measures of competition (GDP
and supplier potential, both in logs) as well as any bilateral measures of trade barriers/enhancers
since there is no variation in country origin (we discuss how we specify those bilateral controls in
further detail in the next paragraph). There are undoubtedly other unobserved characteristics of
countries that aect our dependent skewness variables. These unobserved country characteristics
are common to rms exporting to that destination and hence generate a correlated error-term
structure, potentially biasing downwards the standard error of our variables of interest. The stan-
dard clustering procedure does not apply well here for two reasons: 1) the level of clustering is not
nested within the level of xed eects, and 2) the number of clusters is quite small with respect to
the size of each cluster. Harrigan and Deng (2008) encounter a similar problem and use the solu-
tion proposed by Wooldridge (2006), who recommends to run country-specic random eects on
rm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. This procedure allows to account
for rm xed eects, as well as country-level correlation patterns in the error term. We follow this
estimation strategy here and apply it to all of the reported results below.36
Our rst set of results regresses our two main skewness measures (log export ratio of best to
next best product for global and local product rankings) on destination GDP and foreign supply
potential. The coecients, reported in columns (1) and (4) of Table 2, show a very signicant impact
of both country size and geography on the skewness of a rm's export sales to that destination (we
discuss the economic magnitude in further detail below). This initial specication does not control
for any independent eect of bilateral trade barriers on the skewness of a rm's exported product
mix. Here, we suer from the limitation inherent in our data that we do not observe any variation in
the country of origin for all the export ows. This makes it dicult to separately identify the eects
of those bilateral trade barriers from the destination's supply potential. France is located very near
to the center of the biggest regional trading group in the world. Thus, distance from France is
highly correlated with \good" geography and hence a high supply potential for that destination:
the correlation between log distance and log supply potential is 78%. Therefore, when we introduce
all the controls for bilateral trade barriers to our specication, it is not surprising that there is too
36We have experimented with several other estimation procedures to control for the correlated error structure:
rm-level xed eects with/without country clustering and demeaned data run with simple OLS. Those procedures
highlight that it is important to account for the country-level error-term correlation. This aects the signicance of
the supply potential variable (as we highlight with our preferred estimation procedure). However, the p-values for the
GDP variable are always substantially lower, and none of those procedures come close to overturning the signicance
of that variable.
28much co-linearity with the destination's supply potential to separately identify the independent
eect of the latter.37 These results are reported in columns (2) and (5) of Table 2. Although
the coecient for supply potential is no longer signicant due to this co-linearity problem, the
eect of country size on the skewness of export sales remain highly signicant. Other than country
size, the only other variable that is signicant (at 5% or below) is the eect of a common currency:
export sales to countries in the Eurozone display vastly higher skewness. However, we must exercise
caution when interpreting this eect. Due to the lack of variation in origin country, we cannot say
whether this captures the eect of a common currency between the destination and France, or
whether this is an independent eect of the Euro.38
Although we do not have rm-product-destination data for countries other than France, bilateral
aggregate data is available for the full matrix of origins-destinations in the world. Our theoretical
model predicts a bilateral gravity relationship (25) that can be exploited to recover the combined
eect of bilateral trade barriers as a single parameter (lh in our model). The only property of our
gravity relationship that we exploit is that bilateral trade can be decomposed into exporter and
importer xed eects, and a bilateral component that captures the joint eect of trade barriers.39
We use the same bilateral gravity specication that we previously used to construct supply potential
(again, in logs). We purge bilateral ows from both origin and destination xed eects, to keep
only the contribution of bilateral barriers to trade. This gives us an estimate for the bilateral log
freeness of trade between all country pairs (lnlh).40 We use the subset of this predicted data where
France is the exporting country. Looking across destinations, this freeness of trade variable is still
highly correlated with distance from France (the correlation with log distance is 60% ); but it is
substantially less correlated with the destination's supply potential than distance from France (the
correlation between freeness of trade and log supply potential is 40%, much lower than the 78%
correlation between log distance and log supply potential). This greatly alleviates the co-linearity
problem while allowing us to control for the relevant variation induced by bilateral trade barriers
(i.e. calculated based upon their impact on bilateral trade ows).
37As we mentioned, distance by itself introduces a huge amount of co-linearity with supply potential. The other
bilateral trade controls then further exacerbate this problem (membership in the EU is also strongly correlated with
\good" geography and hence supply potential).
38If this is a destination Euro eect, then this would t well with our theoretical prediction for the eect of tougher
competition in Euro markets on the skewness of export sales.
39This property of gravity equations is not specic to our model. It can be generated by a very large class of
models. Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Head and Mayer (2011) discuss all the dierent models that lead to a similar
gravity decomposition.
40Again, we emphasize that there is a very large class of models that would generate the same procedure for
recovering bilateral freeness of trade.
29Columns (3) and (6) of Table 2 report the results using this constructed freeness of trade measure
as our control for the independent eect of bilateral trade barriers on export skewness. The results
are very similar to our initial ones without any bilateral controls: country size and supply potential
both have a strong and highly signicant eect on the skewness of export sales. These eects
are also economically signicant. The coecient on country size can be directly interpreted as an
elasticity for the sales ratio with respect to country GDP. The 0:107 elasticity for the global ratio
implies that an increase in destination GDP from that of the Czech Republic to German GDP (an
increase from the 79th to 99th percentile in the world's GDP distribution in 2003) would induce
French rms to increase their relative exports of their best product (relative to their next best
global product) by 42.1%: from an observed mean ratio of 20 in 2003 to 28.4.
We now investigate the robustness of this result to dierent skewness measures, to the sample
of destination countries, and to an additional control for destination GDP per capita. From here
on out, we use our constructed freeness of trade measure to control for bilateral trade barriers.
We report the same set of results for the global sales ratio in Table 3 and for the local ratio in
Table 4. The rst column reproduces baseline estimation reported in columns (3) and (6) with the
freeness of trade control. In column (2), we use the sales ratio of the best to third best product as
our dependent skewness variable.41 We then return to sales ratio based on best to next best for
the remaining columns. In order to show that our results are not driven by unmeasured quality
dierences between the products shipped to developed and developing countries, we progressively
restrict our sample of country destinations to a subset of richer countries. In column (3) we restrict
destinations to those above the median country income, and in column (4), we only keep the top
20% of countries ranked by income (GDP per capita).42 In the fth and last column, we keep the
full sample of country destinations and add destination GDP per capita as a regressor in order to
directly control for dierences in preferences across countries (outside the scope of our theoretical
model) tied to product quality and consumer income.43 All of these dierent specications in Tables
3 and 4 conrm the robustness of our baseline results regarding the strong impact of both country
size and geography on the rms' export ratios.44
41We also experimented with the ratio for the second best to third best product, and obtained very similar results.
42Since French rms ship disproportionately more goods to countries with higher incomes, the number of observa-
tions drops very slowly with the number of excluded country destinations.
43In particular, we want to allow consumer income to bias consumption towards higher quality varieties. If within-
rm product quality is negatively related to its distance from the core product, then this would induce a positive
correlation between consumer income and the within-rm skewness of expenditure shares. This is the sign of the
coecient on GDP per capita that we obtain; that coecient is statistically signicant for the regressions based on
the local product ranking.
44When we restrict the sample of destinations to the top 20% of richest countries, then our co-linearity problem
30Table 2: Global and local export sales ratio: core (m = 0) product to second best (m0 = 1) product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Ratio of core to second product sales' regressions
Global ratio Local ratio
ln GDP 0.092 0.083 0.107 0.073 0.057 0.077
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
ln supply potential 0.067 -0.017 0.044 0.080 0.018 0.068
(0.016) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
ln distance -0.063 -0.046
(0.043) (0.023)
contiguity 0.013 -0.108
(0.051) (0.081)
colonial link -0.060 -0.041
(0.051) (0.043)
common language 0.023 -0.048
(0.050) (0.038)
RTA 0.066 0.004
(0.059) (0.033)
common currency 0.182 0.335
(0.047) (0.037)
both in GATT 0.006 -0.033
(0.046) (0.026)
ln freeness of trade 0.096 0.028
(0.026) (0.017)
Constant -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 56096 56096 56092 96889 96889 96876
Within R2 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.007
Note: All columns use Wooldridge's (2006) procedure: country-specic random
eects on rm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estima-
tion. Standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels:
 p < 0:1,

p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
31Table 3: Global export sales ratio: core product (m = 0) to product m0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln GDP 0.107 0.131 0.110 0.096 0.098
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
ln supply potential 0.044 0.038 0.038 0.022 0.036
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016)
ln freeness of trade 0.096 0.085 0.113 0.137 0.092
(0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.026)
ln GDP per cap 0.025
(0.018)
m0 = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 56094 22577 50624 40965 56094
Within R2 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.005
Note: All columns use Wooldridge's (2006) procedure: country-specic random eects
on rm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Signicance levels:
 p < 0:1,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
Table 4: Local export sales ratio: core product (m = 0) to product m0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln GDP 0.077 0.100 0.083 0.061 0.066
(0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.008)
ln supply potential 0.068 0.064 0.051 0.028 0.057
(0.013) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014)
ln freeness of trade 0.028 0.013 0.059 0.092 0.025
(0.017) (0.042) (0.039) (0.052) (0.017)
ln GDP per cap 0.029
(0.013)
m0 = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 96879 49555 84709 64654 96879
Within R2 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.007
Note: All columns use Wooldridge's (2006) procedure: country-specic random eects
on rm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Signicance levels:
 p < 0:1,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
32Lastly, we show that this eect of country size and geography on export skewness is not limited
to the top 2-3 products exported by a rm to a destination. We now use our dierent statistics
that measure the skewness of a rm's export sales over the entire range of exported products. The
rst three columns of Table 5 use the standard deviation, Herndahl index, and Theil index for the
distribution of the rm's export sales to each destination with our baseline specication (freeness
of trade control for bilateral trade barriers and the full sample of destination countries). In the
last three columns, we stick with the Theil index and report the same robustness specications as
we reported for the local and global sales ratio: We reduce the sample of destinations by country
income, and add GDP per capita as an independent control with the full sample of countries.
Throughout Table 5, we add a cubic polynomial in the number of exported products by the rm to
the destination (those coecients are not reported). This controls for any mechanical eect of the
number of exported products on the skewness statistic when the number of exported products is
low. These results show how country size and geography increase the skewness of the rms' entire
exported product mix. Using information on the entire distribution of exported sales increases
the statistical precision of our estimates. The coecients on country size and supply potential are
signicant well beyond the 1% threshold throughout all our dierent specications.
In appendix D, we report versions of Tables 3-5 using the number of French exporters to a
destination as a combined measure of competition for French rms in a destination. This measure
of competition across destinations is also very strongly associated with increased export skewness
in all of our specications.
7 Economic Signicance: Relationship Between Skewness and Productivity
We now quantitatively assess the economic signicance of our main results. We have identied sig-
nicant dierences in skewness across destinations, and want to relate those dierences in skewness
to dierences in competition across destinations { via the lens of our theoretical model. These dif-
ferences in competition are important because tougher competition induces an aggregate increase
in productivity { holding technology xed. In a closed economy, we showed in appendix B how
rm productivity { measured either as output per worker (c) or deated sales per worker R(c)
{ increases when competition increases (the cuto cD decreases). This eect holds even when the
rm's product range M(c) does not change, as it is driven by the increased skewness in the product
resurfaces between the supply potential and freeness of trade measures, and the coecient on supply potential is no
longer statistically signicant at the 5% level (only at the 10% level).
33Table 5: Skewness measures for export sales of all products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln GDP 0.141 0.019 0.047 0.052 0.047 0.041
(0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
ln supply potential 0.125 0.016 0.037 0.033 0.023 0.031
(0.023) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln freeness of trade 0.096 0.007 0.021 0.032 0.045 0.021
(0.036) (0.004) (0.009) (0.013) (0.022) (0.009)
ln GDP per cap 0.013
(0.005)
Dep. Var. s.d. ln x herf theil theil theil theil
Destination GDP/cap all all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 82090 82090 82090 73029 57076 82090
Within R2 0.107 0.164 0.359 0.356 0.341 0.359
Note: All columns use Wooldridge's (2006) procedure: country-specic random eects on rm-demeaned
data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. Signicance
levels:
 p < 0:1,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01. All columns include a cubic polynomial of the number
of products exported by the rm to the country (also included in the within R
2).
mix (towards the best performing products). In the same appendix, we also dene parallel measures
of rm productivity lh(c) and R;lh(c) for the bundle of products exported by rm c from l to h:
Similarly, these productivity measures increase with competition in that destination (lower chh) due
to the same intra-rm reallocations across products driven by the increase in skewness. Since our
available data does not include measures of rm productivity, we must rely on the functional forms
of our theoretical model to quantitatively relate export skewness to competition and productivity.
This represents a signicant departure from our empirical approach up to this point, which has
avoided relying on those functional forms.
In Section 3, we dened aggregate productivity   and  R as the aggregate counterparts to
(c) and R(c), and showed that both aggregate measured were identical, and inversely related to
the cost cuto. This describes the overall response of productivity to changes in the toughness of
competition in the closed economy. We dene the aggregate productivity for all products exported
from l to h in a similar way:  lh and  R;lh are the aggregate counterparts to the rm productivity
measures lh(c) and R;lh(c). In appendix C, we show that these two alternate measures coincide
(just like they do for aggregate productivity in the closed economy) and are inversely proportional
to the cost cuto chh (the toughness of competition in the export destination). Thus, our theo-
retical model predicts that increases in the toughness of competition in a destination { measured
34as percentage decreases in the destination cuto { lead to proportional increases in aggregate pro-
ductivity (same percentage change as the cuto). This aggregate productivity response combines
the eects of skewness on rm productivity, holding the product range xed, as well as reallocation
eects across products when the number of products changes, and reallocation eects across rms.
However, because product market shares continuously drop to zero as competition toughens, the
contribution of the product extensive margin (adding/dropping products) to productivity changes
is second order, while the contribution of product skewness to productivity changes is rst order.
Thus, the unit elasticity between productivity and toughness of competition is driven by the eects
of competition on product skewness. This is the key new channel that we emphasize in this paper.
Our main results in the previous section have quantied the link between observable country
characteristics and export skewness. In particular, we have shown how dierences in GDP induce
signicant dierences in skewness for French exporters. We now quantitatively determine what
dierences in competition (across countries) would yield those same observed dierences in export
skewness. This allows us to associate dierences in competition with the dierences in GDP, in
terms of their eect on the skewness of exports. In our theoretical model, the relationship between
competition in a destination (the cuto chh) and export skewness for rm c from l (measured as the
ratio of a rm's exports of its core product, m = 0, to its next best performing product, m0 = 1) is
given by (26):
rrlh(c) =
rlh(v (m;c))
rlh(v (m0;c))
=
(chh)
2   (lhc)
2
(chh)
2   (lhc=!)
2: (27)
Our results in Tables 3 and 4 measure the average elasticity of this skewness measure with respect
to destination h GDP { across all French exporters that export their top 2 products (global or
local denition) to h. Using (27), we compute the average elasticity of this skewness measure with
respect to competition in h (the cuto chh):
dlnrrlh
dlnchh
=  2k
1   !2
!2
(chhlh)
2
(!2chh=lh)k
Z !2chh=lh
0
ck+1
h
c2
hh   (lhc)
2
ih
c2
hh   (lhc=!)
2
idc
=  2k
1   !2
!2k
Z !2
0
xk+1
(1   x2)(!2   x2)
dx where x  (lh=chh)c 2 [0;!2]
 f(!;k)
Here, we have averaged over all rms in l selling at least 3 products to h as the elasticity is
not dened for some rms exporting 2 products, who become single product exporters when the
35cuto chh decreases. We note that this average elasticity can be written as a function of just
two model parameters: ! (the ladder step size), and k (the shape of the Pareto distribution for
cost/productivity). We thus need empirical estimates of just those two coecients. Several papers
have estimated the Pareto shape coecients k. Crozet and Koenig (2010) estimate a range for
^ k between 1:34 and 4:43 for French exporters (by sector) while Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2011) estimate ^ k = 4:87 for all French rms. This range coincides well with estimates from other
countries: Corcos et al (forthcoming) estimate ^ k = 1:79 across European rms, and Bernard et al
(2003) estimate ^ k = 3:6 for U.S. rms. We report estimates of f(^ !;^ k) for ^ k between 1:34 and 4:87.
In order to estimate ^ !, we use our theoretical model to derive an estimation equation for
#  kln! based on our product-destination export data (see appendix C). This yields a very precise
estimate for #; ^ # =  :13, which we use to recover ^ !, given a choice for ^ k. Given the small standard
error for ^ #, dierences in ^ ! will be driven by our choice of ^ k; however, any alternate assumption for ^ #
will have the same eect on ^ ! as a proportional change in ^ k. This completes our empirical derivation
for the average elasticity of skewness with respect to competition, dlnrrlh=dlnchh  f(!;k): This
elasticity ranges from :635 for ^ k = 1:34 to 2:34 for ^ k = 4:87; it is 1:52 at the midpoint for ^ k = 3:11.
With estimates of this elasticity in hand, we can evaluate the economic signicance of our
previous results from Tables 3 and 4. In those tables, we reported an average elasticity of skewness
to country GDP between :06 and :11. Dividing those elasticities by our estimate for dlnrrlh=dlnchh
yields the change in competition that would induce the same change in skewness as a doubling of
country GDP. In our theoretical model, those changes in competition are proportional to changes
in aggregate productivity for the bundle of goods sold in that destination. Viewed through this
lens, the economic impact of the changes in skewness are quite large. For a doubling of country
GDP, they imply changes in productivity between 2.56% and 17.3%. At our midpoint for ^ k, the
implied productivity changes are between 3.95% and 7.24%.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model of multi-product rms that highlights how dierences in
market size and geography aect the within-rm distribution of export sales across destinations.
This eect on the rms' product mix choice is driven by variations in the toughness of competition
across markets. Tougher competition induces a downward shift in the distribution of markups
across all products, and increases the relative market share of the better performing products. We
test these predictions for a comprehensive set of French exporters, and nd that market size and ge-
36ography indeed have a very strong impact on their exported product mix across world destinations:
French rms skew their export sales towards their better performing products in big destination
markets, and markets where many exporters from around the world compete (high foreign supply
potential markets). We have obtained these results without imposing the specic functional forms
(for demand, for the geometric product ladder, and for the Pareto inverse cost draws) that we used
in our theoretical model. We therefore view our results as giving a strong indication of substantial
dierences in competition across export markets { rather than providing goodness of t test to our
specic model (and its functional forms). We cannot measure markups directly but the strong link
between tougher competition and a more skewed product mix is suggestive of substantial markup
adjustments by exporters across destinations. In any event, trade models based on exogenous
markups cannot explain this strong signicant link between destination market characteristics and
the within-rm skewness of export sales (after controlling for bilateral trade costs).
Theoretically, we showed how such an increase in skewness towards better performing products
(driven by tougher competition) would also be reected in higher rm productivity. We cannot
directly test this link without productivity data. Instead, we have leaned more heavily on the func-
tional forms of our theoretical model. A calibrated t to that model reveals that these productivity
eects are potentially quite large.
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38Appendix
A Trade Liberalization
In this appendix, we briey discuss the predictions of our model regarding trade liberalization
(unilateral and multilateral) in the context of a 2 country version of our model. The main message
is that the eects of trade liberalization on aggregate variables (competition, productivity, welfare)
are identical to those analyzed in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in the context of single-product
rms. However, our current model allows us to translate those aggregate changes into predictions
for the responses of multi-product rms. The main link is the one we have emphasized (both
theoretically and empirically) in the cross-section of destinations: how changes in competition
lead to associated changes in the multi-product rms' product mix and hence to changes in their
productivity. In this respect, the predictions are starkly dierent than the case of single-product
rms where productivity (output per worker) is exogenously xed independently of the competitive
environment.
Equation (21) summarizes the eect of trade costs on competition in every market (the resulting
cost cuto chh) via the matrix of trade freeness P = [lh] where lh   k
lh < 1. In a two country
world, this simplies to:
chh =
1   hl
1   hllh



Lh
 1
k+2
; l 6= h: (A.1)
Equation (22) then expresses the resulting product variety in country h as a function of that cuto.
The determination of the cuto in (A.1) is very similar to the case of single-product rms: this
is the case where 
 = 1. Trade liberalization thus induces a similar response as in the single-
product case. Bilateral trade liberalization (higher lh and hl) increases competition in both
countries (lower cutos chh and cll). On the other hand, unilateral trade liberalization in country
h (higher lh with hl remaining unchanged) results in weaker competition in h (higher chh) and
tougher competition in its trading partner l (lower cll). This divergence is due to the impact of the
asymmetric liberalization on the rms' entry decisions: unilateral trade liberalization by h increases
the incentives for entry in its trading parter l; entry in h is reduced, while entry in l increases. We
can also dene a short-run equilibrium in a similar way to the one dened for single-product rms
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). With entry xed in the short run, unilateral trade liberalization
will then increase competition in the liberalizing country, due to the increase in import competition
(in the long run, the increase in import competition is more than oset by the eects of exit). An
A-1analysis of preferential trade liberalization would also lead to similar resuls on competition as those
described in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
B Tougher Competition and Firm Productivity
In Section 3 we argued that tougher competition induces improvements in rm productivity through
its impact on a rm's product mix. Here we show that both rm productivity measures, output
per worker (c) and deated sales per worker R(c), increase for all multi-product rms when
competition increases (cD decreases). We provide proofs for the closed as well as the open economy.
In both cases we proceed in two steps. First, we show that, holding a rm's product scope constant,
rm productivity over that product scope increases whenever competition increases. Then, we
extend the argument by continuity to cover the case where tougher competition induces a change
in product scope.
B.1 Closed Economy
Consider a rm with cost c producing M(c) varieties. Output per worker is given by
(c) =
Q(c)
C(c)
=
PM(c) 1
m=0 q (v (m;c))
PM(c) 1
m=0 v (m;c)q (v (m;c))
=
L
2
PM(c) 1
m=0 (cD   ! mc)
L
2
PM(c) 1
m=0 ! m (cD   ! mc)
:
For a xed product scope M with 1 < M  M(c), this can be written as
(c) =
!M (1   !)
! (1   !M)
M
c
cD   c
M
!(1 !M)
!M(1 !)
cD   c
!(1+!M)
!M(1+!)
; (B.1)
subject to c 2 [cD!M;cD!M 1]. Dierentiating (B.1) with respect to cD implies that
d(c)
dcD
< 0 () c
!
 
1 + !M
!M (1 + !)
>
c
M
!
 
1   !M
!M (1   !)
or, equivalently, if and only if
M >
(1 + !)
 
1   !M
(1 + !M)(1   !)
: (B.2)
This is always the case for M > 1: the left- and right-hand sides are identical for M = 0 and
M = 1, and the right hand side is increasing and concave in M. This proves that, holding M > 1
constant, a rm's output per worker is larger in a market where competition is tougher (lower cD).
A-2Even when product scope M drops due to the decrease in cD, output per worker must still
increase due to the continuity of (c) with respect to cD (both Q(c) and C(c) are continuous in
cD as the rm produces zero units of a variety right before it is dropped when competition gets
tougher). To see this, consider a large downward change in the cuto cD. The result for given
M tells us that output per worker for a rm with given c increases on all ranges of cD where the
number of varieties produced does not change. This just leaves a discrete number of cD's where
the rm changes the number of products produced. Since (c) is continuous at those cD's, and
increasing everywhere else, it must be increasing everywhere.
The unavailability of data on physical output often leads to a measure of productivity in terms
of deated sales per worker. Over the xed product scope M with 1 < M  M(c), this alternate
productivity measure is dened as
R(c) =
R(c)=  P
C(c)
=
1
2
k + 2
k + 1
1
cD
M (cD)
2   c2!2 1 !2M
!2M(1 !)(1+!)
cDc! 1 !M
!M(1 !)   c2!2 1 !2M
!2M(1 !)(1+!)
; (B.3)
subject to c 2 [cD!M;cD!M 1]. Dierentiating (B.3) with respect to cD then yields
d

R(c)=  P
C(c)

dcD
=  
1
2
k + 2
k + 1
1 + !M
1   !M
M!2M  
1   !2
(cD)
2   2c!M+1 (1 + !)
 
1   !M
cD + c2!2  
1   !2M
(cD)
2 [!M (1 + !)cD   c! (1 + !M)]
2 < 0:
Here, we have used the fact that c 2 [cD!M;cD!M 1] implies
M!2M  
1   !2 
c=!M2
  2c!M+1 (1 + !)
 
1   !M 
c=!M
> 0:
This proves that, holding M > 1 constant, this alternative productivity measure R(c) also in-
creases when competition is tougher (lower cD). The same reasoning applies to the case where
tougher competition induces a reduction in product scope M.
Note that, in the special case of M = 1, we have
R(c) =
1
2
k + 2
k + 1

1
c
+
1
cD

:
Hence, whereas tougher competition (lower cD) has no impact on the output per worker (c) of
a single-product rm, it still raises deated sales per worker R(c). This is due to the fact that
A-3deated sales per worker are also aected by markup changes when the toughness of competition
changes.
B.2 Open Economy
Consider a rm with cost c selling Mlh(c) varieties from country l to country h. Exported output
per worker is given by
lh(c) 
Qlh(c)
Clh(c)
=
PMlh(c) 1
m=0 chh   lh! mc
PMlh(c) 1
m=0 (lh! mc)(chh   lh! mc)
:
For a xed product scope M with 1 < M  Mlh(c), this can be written as
lh(c) =
!M (1   !)
! (1   !M)
M
clh
chh  
clh
M
!(1 !M)
!M(1 !)
chh   clh
!(1+!M)
!M(1+!)
; (B.4)
subject to clh 2 [chh!M;chh!M 1]. Dierentiating (B.4) with respect to chh yields
dlh(c)
dchh
< 0 () clh
!
 
1 + !M
!M (1 + !)
>
clh
M
!
 
1   !M
!M (1   !)
This must hold for M > 1 (see (B.2)). Hence, tougher competition (lower chh) in the destination
market increases exported output per worker. As in the closed economy, the fact that output per
worker is continuous at a discrete number of chh's and decreasing in chh everywhere else implies
that it is decreasing in chh everywhere.
We now turn to productivity measured as deated export sales per worker. Over the xed
product scope M with 1 < M  M(c); this is dened as
R;lh(c) =
Rlh(c)=  Ph
Clh(c)
=
1
2
k + 2
k + 1
1
chh
M (chh)
2   c2 (lh)
2 !2 1 !2M
!2M(1 !)(1+!)
chhclh! 1 !M
!M(1 !)   c2 (lh)
2 !2 1 !2M
!2M(1 !)(1+!)
; (B.5)
subject to clh 2 [chh!M;chh!M 1]. Dierentiating (B.5) with respect to chh yields
dR;lh(c)
dchh
=  
1
2
k + 2
k + 1
1 + !M
1   !M
M!2M  
1   !2
(chh)
2   2clh!M+1 (1 + !)
 
1   !M
chh + c2 (lh)
2 !2  
1   !2M
(chh)
2 [!M (1 + !)chh   clh! (1 + !M)]
2 < 0:
A-4The last inequality holds since clh 2 [chh!M;chh!M 1] implies
M!2M  
1   !2 
clh=!M2
  2clh!M+1 (1 + !)
 
1   !M 
clh=!M
> 0:
This proves that, holding M > 1 constant, productivity measured as deated export sales per
worker increases with tougher competition in the export market (lower chh). The same applies to
the case where the tougher competition induces a response in the exported product scope M, as
R;lh(c) is continuous in chh.
C Calibration of Relationship Between Skewness and Productivity
C.1 Aggregate Productivity Index for Bundle of Exported Goods
In the previous appendix section, we dened productivity indices for rm's c bundle of exported
goods from l to h as the output per worker associated with that bundle of exports:
lh(c) 
Qlh(c)
Clh(c)
and R;lh(c) =
Rlh(c)=  Ph
Clh(c)
;
where the R subscript are productivity measures based on deated sales as a measure of rm
output. The aggregate counterparts for all bilateral exports from l to h are just the same measures
of output per worker computed for the aggregate bundle of exported goods:
 lh 
R !mchh=lh
0 Qlh(c)dG(c)
R !mchh=lh
0 Clh(c)dG(c)
=
k + 2
k
1
chh
;
 R;lh 
hR !mchh=lh
0 Rlh(c)dG(c)
i
=  Ph
R !mchh=lh
0 Clh(c)dG(c)
=
k + 2
k
1
chh
:
Just like the case of aggregate productivity in the closed economy, our two aggregate productivity
measures overlap and are inversely proportional to the cuto chh in the export destination h.
C.2 Estimating the Product Ladder Step Size !
We obtain an estimating equation for the ladder step size ! by aggregating all the product export
sales across rms (for bilateral exports from l to h) that are at the same ladder step m:
Rlh(m) =
Z chh=(lh! m)
0
Rlh(c;m)d

c
cM
k
=
"
L
 (k + 2)
(chh)
k+2
(lhcM)
k
#
!km:
A-5Thus, Rlh(0) represents aggregate exports of core products from l to h; Rlh(1) for the second best
performing product, and so forth for the product that is m steps from the core product. This
implies a linear relationship between the log of product export sales lnRlh(m) and its associated
ladder step m, with a slope given by #  kln! and an intercept that varies across bilateral country
pairs. We can easily compute Rlh(m) from our data by aggregating rm-product export sales from
France to any destination h { across all products at the same ladder step m. A linear regression of
lnRlh(m) on m with destination h xed eects (capturing the term in the brackets) will then yield
our estimate for ^ # (origin country l is held xed for France).
We visually summarize this regression in Figure C.1, where we have eliminated the destination
xed-eects by demeaning the export sales lnRlh(m) and the associated product m by destination
h. By construction, this regression must deliver a negative tted line. However, Figure C.1 also
clearly reveals that the linear relationship provides an excellent t. The gure also reveals that our
slope coecient ^ # =  :13 is very tightly estimated, with no appreciable slope variation within a
99% condence interval.
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FigureC.1: Regressionyieldingestimateof #
A-6D Robustness to Alternate Measure of Toughness of Competition
As we mentioned in the main text, we repeat our main estimation procedures using the number
of French exporters to a destination as a combined measure of the toughness of competition (for
French rms) in a destination. We begin by showing the scatterplots of the mean global ratio
plotted against this alternate competition measure (direct parallel to Figures (2 and 3). Figure D.1
clearly shows that there is also a very strong increasing relationship between the global ratio and
this alternate measure of competition.
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FigureD.1:MeanGlobalRatioand#FrenchexportersinDestinationCountryin2003
WenextreplicateTables3-5replacingcountryGDPandsupplypotentialwiththenumberof
Frenchexporterstothedestination(inlogs).Thosetablesclearlyshowthatallourresultsare
robusttothisalternatemeasureofcompetitionacrossdestinations. 1
1We have also constructed a sector-level competition proxy by counting the French exporters in a destination
only within a 2-digit HS sector. Using this alternate measure of competition does not materially aect any of the
specications in those 3 tables. We also ran some specications using all three competition measures jointly (GDP,
supply potential, and number of exporters). Adding the third competition regressor does not aect the impact of the
our rst two baseline competition measures. The independent eect of the third measure remained signicant for the
global and overall skewness specications.
A-7Table D.1: Global export sales ratio: core product (m = 0) to product m0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln # French exporters 0.226 0.263 0.233 0.200 0.200
(0.020) (0.032) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024)
ln freeness of trade -0.034 -0.078 -0.019 0.018 -0.029
(0.032) (0.029) (0.037) (0.043) (0.033)
ln GDP per cap 0.031
(0.019)
m0 = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 56094 22577 50624 40965 56094
Within R2 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.005
Note: All columns use Wooldridge's (2006) procedure: country-specic random eects
on rm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Signicance levels:
 p < 0:1,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
Table D.2: Local export sales ratio: core product (m = 0) to product m0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln # French exporters 0.178 0.210 0.178 0.119 0.129
(0.012) (0.027) (0.026) (0.035) (0.018)
ln freeness of trade -0.056 -0.096 -0.026 0.027 -0.040
(0.026) (0.050) (0.045) (0.058) (0.026)
ln GDP per cap 0.049
(0.013)
m0 = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 96879 49555 84709 64654 96879
Within R2 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.007
Note: All columns use Wooldridge's (2006) procedure: country-specic random eects
on rm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Signicance levels:
 p < 0:1,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
A-8Table D.3: Skewness measures for export sales of all products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln # French exporters 0.348 0.045 0.111 0.118 0.102 0.086
(0.025) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
ln freeness of trade -0.065 -0.014 -0.034 -0.027 -0.007 -0.024
(0.048) (0.005) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012)
ln GDP per cap 0.022
(0.006)
Dep. Var. s.d. ln x herf theil theil theil theil
Destination GDP/cap all all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 82090 82090 82090 73029 57076 82090
Within R2 0.106 0.163 0.358 0.356 0.341 0.359
Note: All columns use Wooldridge's (2006) procedure: country-specic random eects on rm-demeaned
data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. Signicance
levels:
 p < 0:1,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01. All columns include a cubic polynomial of the number
of products exported by the rm to the country (also included in the within R
2).
E Selection of Products into the Local Ranking
Figure E.1 plots changes in the average number of export destinations for a product as a function
of its global ranking. The number of destinations is measured relative to the rm-mean number of
destinations (across products). We restrict the plots to the rms' top ten products (according to
their global ranking). In one of the plots, we also restrict the sample of rms to those that export
at least ten products, so that there is no change in the sample of rms for the entire plot. We also
show a plot for all rms in our analysis sample (that export at least two products). Here, there is
attrition of rms along the plot as the global rank increases { but the plot is surprisingly similar
to the one without any change in rm selection.
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Figure E.1: Number of Export Destinations as a Function of a Product's Global Rank
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